War of the Pacific
The War of the Pacific (Spanish: Guerra del Pacífico) took place in western South America from 1879 through 1883. The forces of Chile fought a defensive alliance of Boliviaand Peru. The conflict is also known as the "Saltpeter War", as disputes over mineral-rich territory were the war's prime cause. The conflict originated in a dispute between Chile and Bolivia over a 10 cent tax on the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company, but Bolivia and Chile's controversy over ownership of Atacama preceded and laid foundations for the conflict. Peru entered the affair in 1879, initially attempting to mediatethe dispute, but when Chile invaded the Bolivian port city of Antofagasta on February 14, 1879, Bolivia activated its mutual defense treaty with Peru.
The five-year war took place over a variety of terrain, including the Atacama Desert and Peru's deserts and mountainous regions. The war's first battle was the Battle of Topáter. For most of the first year the focus was on the naval campaign, as Chile struggled to establish a sea-based resupply corridor for its forces in the world's driest desert. ThePeruvian Navy met initial success, but theChilean Navy prevailed. Afterwards, Chile'sland campaign bested the badly equippedBolivian and Peruvian armies, leading to Bolivia's complete defeat and withdrawal in the Battle of Tacna on May 26, 1880, and the defeat of the Peruvian army after the Battle of Arica on June 7. The land campaign climaxed in 1881, with the Chileanoccupation of Lima. The conflict then became a guerrilla war engaging Peruvian army remnants and irregulars. ThisCampaign of the Breña was fairly successful as a resistance movement, but did not change the war's outcome. After Peru's defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco, Chile and Peru signed the Treaty of Ancón on October 20, 1883. Bolivia signed a truce with Chile in 1884.
Chile acquired the Peruvian territory ofTarapacá, the disputed Bolivian department of Litoral (cutting Bolivia off from the sea), as well as temporary control over the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica. In 1904, Chile and Bolivia signed the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" establishing definite boundaries. The situation between Chile and Peru worsened when the 1893 plebiscite to determine the fate of the provinces of Arica and Tacna was not held. Colonization and violent "Chileanization" of the territories resulted in a break of relations in 1911. The 1929 Tacna–Arica compromise gave Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru, but did not resolve the antipathy. Later political problems among these neighbors often referred back to this conflict.
The dry climate of the Peruvian and Bolivian coasts had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits such as guano (bird excrement) and saltpeter. In the 1840s, guano's newfound value as fertilizer and saltpeter's role in explosives made the Atacama desertstrategically and economically important. Bolivia, Chile and Peru found themselves sitting on the largest reserves of a resource that the world suddenly needed. During the Chincha Islands War (1864–1866), Spain, under Queen Isabella II, attempted to exploit an incident involving Spanish citizens in Peru to re-establish Spanish influence over the guano-rich Chincha Islands, lost following theViceroyalty of Peru. Peru and Chile signed a treaty of alliance against Spain on December 5, 1865.Together, with the minor aid of Bolivia and Ecuador (who had fought an inconclusive war with Peru from 1858 to 1860), they forced the Spanish to withdraw after victories at Papudo, Abtao, and Callao. Chile, however, endured terrible losses after the bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spanish fleet on March 31, 1866.
During this time mutual interests sustained a Peru/Chile alliance, while Bolivia and Chile fell into a border dispute. Claiming territory according to the uti possidetis principle, the two disagreed on whether the territory of Charcas had access to the sea. Charcas had been part of the Viceroyalty of Peru and, later, part of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. Eventually, the two countries negotiated theBoundary Treaty of 1866 ("Treaty of Mutual Benefits"). The treaty established the 24th parallel south as their mutual boundary. The two countries gained equal rights to tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the23rd and 25th parallels, which covered a large part of theAtacama Desert. In 1872, a private note between ministers shows Peru desired to help resolve the boundary dispute with its maritime influence. Peruvian minister Riva-Agüero believed that Chile would take possession of the coast-line once they acquired naval strength from their newironclads.
Atacama quickly became populated by Chilean investors backed by European (mainly British) capital. The natural barrier of the Andes mountains divided the Bolivian altiplano from Atacama, preventing the Bolivians from colonizing the area. Chilean and foreign enterprises in the region eventually extended their control all the way to the Peruvian saltpeter mines. During the 1870s, Peru capitalized on the guano exploitation and nationalized all industries in the region, leaving Peru with 58.8% of all saltpeter production, while Chile held 19% and Great Britain 13.5%. After the War of the Pacific, Peru was left without saltpeter production, the Chilean production decreased to 15%, and Great Britain's production rose to 55%.
On February 6, 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a mutual defense treaty which guaranteed their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. An additional clause kept the treaty secret.Argentina had begun talks with Peru and Bolivia to join the alliance, and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, in a secret session, approved the law, but the Senate postponed the matter to 1874. Chile was not directly mentioned in the treaty text and was not informed about its existence, which led Chilean historiography to conclude that the treaty was aimed against Chile.
In 1874, Chile and Bolivia replaced the 1866 boundary treaty with a treaty granting Bolivia the authority to collect all tax revenue between the 23rd and 24th parallels, fixing the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years and calling for Bolivia to open up. Chilean companies executed most of the exploitation of the Atacama coastal region. On December 26, 1874, the recently built ironcladCochrane arrived in Valparaiso; it remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada threw the balance of south Pacific power towards Chile. In 1875 Peru postponed the Argentine signing of the alliance treaty.
A major crisis took place in 1878 when the National Congress of Bolivia and a National Constituent Assembly determined an 1873 contract authorizing the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company to extract saltpeter duty-free for 15 years to be moot because it had never been ratified by the Bolivian Congress, as required by the constitution. The Congress proposed to approve the contract if the company would pay a 10 cents per quintal tax, but the company objected that the increased payments were illegal and demanded an intervention from the Chilean government. In response, Chile claimed that the treaty did not allow for such a tax hike. Bolivia suspended the tax in April 1878. In November Chile suggested the possibility of nullifying the treaty if Bolivia continued to insist on the taxes. Bolivia then said the tax was unrelated to the treaty and that the claim of the Nitrate Company should be addressed in Bolivian courts, and revived the tax. When the company refused to pay the tax, Bolivia threatened to confiscate its property. In December 1878, Chile dispatched a warship to the area.
After the company failed to pay the tax, Bolivia seized it and announced an auction for February 4, 1879. Chile threatened that such an action would render the border treaty null and, on the day of the auction, 500 Chilean soldiers arrived by ship and occupied the port city ofAntofagasta without a fight. According to Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, the Chilean troops occupied the city with little resistance and experienced widespread support. Antofagasta's population was 93–95% Chilean.
On February 18, while in Antofagasta, Chilean colonelEmilio Sotomayor intercepted a letter from Bolivian presidential Hilarión Daza to Bolivian prefect-colonel Severino Zapata. The letter allegedly mentioned Daza's worry of Chilean interference with Bolivia's nationalization of British saltpeter companies, and mentioned a previously secret treaty that Bolivia would, if necessary, demand that Peru honor should Chile declare war. After Chilean soldiers arrived in Antofagasta, Daza issued a presidential decreeon March 1, 1879, which expelled Chileans, nationalized Chilean private property and prohibited trade and communications with Chile "as long as the war lasts". The Chilean government interpreted the decree as a declaration of war. However, although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared by either side. Bolivia then called on Peru to activate the defense treaty as they felt that the Chilean action constituted a casus foederis.
Peru sent a senior diplomat, Jose Antonio Lavalle to mediate with the Chilean government and request that Chile return Antofagasta to Bolivia. The Chilean government stalled, suspecting that Peru's attempt was not bona fide, and that it was only trying to delay until it completed its war preparations. Previous Peruvian demands had favored Bolivia and Lavalle denied knowing about the existence of the treaty, which discomfited the Chileans. On March 14, Alejandro Fierro, Chile's minister of foreign affairs, sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government. On March 17, Godoy formally presented the Chilean proposal in a meeting with Peruvian president Mariano Ignacio Prado. The following day Prado told Godoy about the a secret treaty.
A few days later, on March 23, 1879, while on their way to occupy Calama, north of 23rd parallel, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry fought 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilians dug in at two destroyed bridges next to the Topáter river. This Battle of Topáter was the war's first. Bolivian troops under the command of Dr. Ladislao Cabrera refused to surrender prior to or during the battle. Outnumbered and low onammunition, the Bolivian force withdrew except for a small group of civilians led by Colonel Eduardo Abaroa, who fought to the end.
On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia by proposing that the Peruvian Congress debate both Chile's neutrality proposal and the Bolivian request for military action under the alliance on April 24. On March 31, after receiving the treaty from Lima, Lavalle proceeded to read the whole text to Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile. Acknowledging the alliance, Chile responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both countries on April 5, 1879. On April 6, Peru acknowledged casus foederis.
Military strength comparison
|Cochrane||3,560||3,000||9-12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
|Blanco Encalada||3,560||3,000||9-12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
|Manco Cápac (ex USS Oneota)||1,034||320||6||10||2x500-pounders||1864|
|Atahualpa (ex USS Catawba)||1,034||320||6||10||2x500-pounders||1864|
As the war began, thePeruvian Armynumbered 5,241 men of all ranks, organized in seven infantrybattalions, three squadrons ofcavalry and tworegiments ofartillery. The most commonrifles in the army were the FrenchChassepot and the Minié rifles. The artillery, with a total of twenty-eight pieces, was composed mostly of British-made Blakely cannon and counted four machine guns. Much of the artillery dated from 1866, and had been bought for the Chincha Islands War against Spain. The mounts used by the cavalry were small and inferior to the Chileans'.
The Bolivian Army numbered no more than 2,175 soldiers, divided into three infantry regiments, two cavalry squadrons, and two sections of artillery. The Colorados Battalion, President Daza's personal guard, was armed with Remington Rolling Block rifles, but the remainder carried odds and ends including flintlock muskets. The artillery had three rifled pounders and four machine guns, while the cavalry rode mules given a shortage of good horses.
The regular Chilean Army was well equipped, with 2,694 soldiers. By April 5, when Chile formally declared war, the army had grown to 7,906 men. The regular infantry was armed with the modern Belgian Comblain rifle, of which Chile had a stock of some 13,000. Chile also had Grass, Minie, Remington and Beaumont rifles which mostly fired the same caliber cartridge (11 mm). The artillery had seventy-five artillery pieces, most of which were of Krupp and Limache manufacture, and six machine guns. The cavalry used French sabers and Spencer and Winchester carbines.
Given the few roads and railroad lines, the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama Desert was difficult to occupy. From the beginning naval superiority was critical. Bolivia had no navy, so on March 26 of 1879 Hilarión Daza formally offered letters of marque to any ships willing to fight for Bolivia. The Armada de Chile and Marina de Guerra del Perú fought the naval battles.
Chilean naval power was based on the twin armoredfrigates, Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, each of 3,560 tons and equipped with 6x250 pound muzzle-loading guns, 2x70 pound guns, 2x40 pound guns, and an armored belt with a maximum thickness of 9 inches (23 cm). The ships' maximum operating speed was about 12knots. The fleet included the corvettes Chacabuco,O'Higgins, and Esmeralda, the gunboat Magallanes, and theschooner Covadonga.
Peruvian naval power relied on the armored frigateIndependencia and the monitor Huáscar. The Independencia weighed 3,500 tons, with 4.5 inches (11 cm) armor, 2x150 pound guns, 12x70 pounders, 4x32 pounders, and 4x9 pound guns.Her maximum operating speed was about 12 knots. The monitor Huáscar weighed 1,745 tons, had 4.5 inch armor and possessed 2 muzzle-loading 300 pound guns located in a revolving turret. She had a maximum operating speed of 10–11 knots. The fleet was completed by the corvette Unión, the gunboat Pilcomayo, and the fluvial monitors BAP Atahualpa and BAP Manco Cápac. Although both the Chilean and Peruvian ironclads seemed evenly matched, the Chilean ironclads had twice the armor and greater range and hitting power.
Early on Chile blockaded the Peruvian port of Iquique, on April 5. This first naval encounter was the indecisiveBattle of Chipana of April 12, 1879, in which the ChileanMagallanes escaped the Unión and Pilcomayo, but was unable to complete its reconnaissance mission. In the May 21, 1879 Battle of Iquique, Captain Miguel Grau Seminario (known as the "Knight of the Seas" due to hischivalry) commanded the Huáscar, and managed to sink the Esmeralda. Esmerelda's commander, CommanderArturo Prat Chacón, died in combat and became Chile's greatest naval hero. At around the same time, theIndependencia, led by Captain Juan Guillermo More, chased the Chilean schooner Covadonga(Lieutenant Commander Carlos Condell) into shallow coastal waters which eventually caused the heavier Independencia to wreck at the Punta Gruesa. The naval battles of Iquique and Punta Gruesa gave a tactical victory to Peru: the blockade was defeated and the Chilean ships retreated or were sunk. Nevertheless, it was a pyrrhic victory; losing the Independencia, one of Peru's most important ships, was a fatal blow.
Despite being outnumbered, the Huáscar, under Grau's command, managed to hold off the Chilean navy for six months. During this time the Huáscar participated in the Battle of Antofagasta(May 26, 1879) and the Second Battle Antofagasta (August 28, 1879). The climax finally came with the capture of the steamship Rímac on July 23, 1879, while carrying a cavalry regiment (theCarabineros de Yungay), the Chilean army's largest loss to that point. The loss led Admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo to resign. Commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas replaced Rebolledoand devised a plan to catch the Huáscar.
The Punta Angamos, on October 8, 1879 proved decisive. In this battle, Chile captured Huáscar, despite her crew's attempts to scuttle her. Miguel Grau Seminario died during the fighting, but his deeds made him a Pervian national hero. The Peruvian navy won the Naval Battle of Arica(February 27, 1880) and the Second Naval Battle of Arica (March 17, 1880), before being completely defeated during the Blockade of Callao. Chile set the Peruvian fleet on fire and destroyed or appropriated Callao's coastal defense materiel.
Once it had achieved naval superiority, the Chilean army initiated a series of military maneuvers in the Peruvian provinces of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. TheCampaign of Tarapaca began on November 2, 1879, when Chilean troops landed and attacked beach defenses in Pisagua, some 500 kilometres (310 mi) north of Antofagasta. That night, the Chilean army moved inland. From Pisagua the Chileans marched south towards Iquique and on November 19, 1879, defeated the allied troops gathered in Agua Santa in the Battle of San Francisco and Dolores. Bolivian forces retreated to Oruro and the Peruvians fell back to Tiliviche, while the Chilean army captured Iquique. A detachment of Chilean soldiers, with cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapacá. Peruvian forces marched towards Arica to reach Bolivian troops led by Daza coming from Arica, but in Camarones Daza decided to return towards Arica. The two sides clashed on November 27 in the Battle of Tarapacá, where the Chilean forces were defeated, but the Peruvian forces, unable to maintain the territory, retreated north toArica. Bruce W. Farcau comments that, "The province of Tarapacá was lost along with a population of 200,000, nearly one tenth of the Peruvian total, and an annual gross income of ₤ 28 million in nitrate production, virtually all of the country's export earnings." The victory afforded Santiago an economic boon and a potential diplomatic asset.
The Peruvian government was confronted with widespread rioting in Lima because of its failures. On December 18, 1879, Peruvian president Prado went from Callao to Panama, allegedly with six millionpesos in gold, with the duty to oversee the purchase of new arms and warships for the nation. In a statement for the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio, he turned over the command of the country to vice president La Puerta, but a coup d'état led by Nicolás de Piérola overthrew the government and took power on December 23, 1879. In Bolivia, after receiving a telegram on December 27, informing him that the army had overthrown him, Daza departed to Europe with $500,000. General Narciso Camperobecame Bolivia's new president.
Meanwhile, Chile continued its advances in the Campaign of Tacna and Arica. On November 28, Chile declared the formal blockade of Arica. :214 A Chilean force of 600 men carried out an amphibious raid at Ilo as a reconnaissance in force, to the north of Tacna, on December 31, and withdrew the same day. On February 24, 1880 approximately 11,000 men in nineteen ships (protected by Blanco Encalada, Toro, and Magallanes and two torpedo boats) sailed from Pisagua and arrived off Punta Coles, near Pacocha, Ilo on February 26. The landing took several days without resistance. The Peruvian commander, Lizardo Montero, refused to try to drive the Chileans from the beachhead, as the Chileans had expected.:217 On March 22, 3,642 Chilean troops defeated 1,300 Peruvian troops in theBattle of Los Ángeles,:222 cutting any direct Peruvian supply from Lima to Arica or Tacna (Supply was possible only through the long way over Bolivia). After the Battle of Los Ángeles, only three allied positions remained in southern Peru: General Leyva's 2nd Army at Arequipa (including some survivors from Los Ángeles), Bolognesi's 7th and 8th Divisions at Arica, and at Tacna the 1st Army. These forces were under Campero's direct command. However, they were unable to concentrate troops or even to move from their garrisons. After crossing 40 miles (64 km) of desert, on May 26 the Chilean army (14,147 men :229) destroyed the allied army of 5,150 Bolivians and 8,500 Peruvians in the Battle of Tacna. The need for a port near the army to supply and reinforce the troops and evacuate the wounded compelled the Chilean command to concentrate on the remaining Peruvian stronghold of Arica. On June 7, after the Battle of Arica, the last Peruvian bastion in the Tacna Department fell. After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the Peruvian and Bolivian regular armies ceased to exist,:256 and Bolivia effectively left the war.
To show Peru the futility of further resistance, on September 4, 1880 the Chilean government dispatched an expedition of 2,200 men to northern Peru under the command of Captain Patricio Lynch to collect war taxes from wealthy landowners. Lynch's Expedition arrived on September 10 to Chimbote:260-and levied taxes of $100,000 in Chimbote, $10,000 in Paita, $20,000 in Chiclayo, and $4,000 in Lambayeque in local currencies; those who did not comply had their property impounded, destroyed or were killed. On September 11, the Peruvian government decreed that payment was an act of treason, but most landowners still paid, given the many death threats.
Before the United States became formally involved, France, England, and Italy jointly proposed that Chile receive Tarapacá and withdrew their troops to the Camarones River; Chile accepted this solution.
On October 22, 1880, delegates of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and the United States Minister Plenipotentiary in Chile held a 5-day conference aboard the USS Lackawanna in Arica. The Lackawanna Conference, also called the Arica conference, attempted to develop a peace settlement. Chile demanded the Peruvian Tarapacá province and the Bolivian Atacama, an indemnity of $20,000,000 goldpesos, restoration of property taken from Chilean citizens, the Rimac's return, abrogating the treaty between Peru and Bolivia and Peru's formal commitment not to mount artillery batteries in Arica's harbor. Arica was to be limited to commercial use only. Celae planned to retain the territories of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica until all peace treaty conditions were satisfied. Although willing to accept the negotiated settlement, Peru and Bolivia insisted that Chile withdraw its forces from all occupied lands as a precondition for discussing peace. Having captured this territory at great expense, Chile declined the terms and the negotiations failed.
Campaign of Lima
After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the southern departments of Peru were in Chilean hands, and the armies of Peru and Bolivia could no longer fight. The Chilean government had no reason to continue the war. However, public pressure and expansionist ambitions demanded an invasion of Lima to "exterminate the enemy." The defeated allies not only failed to realize their situation but, despite the empty Bolivian treasury, on June 16, 1880, the National Assembly voted to continue the war. On June 11, 1880, a document was signed in Peru declaring the creation of the United States of Peru-Bolivia. This situation forced both the Chilean government and its high command to plan a new campaign to obtain anunconditional surrender.
The Chilean forces confronted virtually the entire civilian population of Lima. The irregulars defended prepared positions, supported by a formidable collection of coastal guns located a few miles from the capital's arsenal and supply depots.:258-259 President Pierola ordered the construction of two parallel defense lines at Chorrillos andMiraflores a few kilometers south of Lima. The line of Chorrillos was 10 miles (16 km) long, lying from Marcavilca hill to La Chira, passing through the steep terrain of San Juan and Santa Teresa.:276- The Peruvian forces were approximately 26,000 untrained civilians between Arequipa and Lima. A small Chilean force went ashore near Pisco, approximately 200 miles (320 km) south of Lima, while the mass of the army disembarked in Chilca only 45 kilometres (28 mi) from the city. On January 13, 1881, the 20,000 Chilean troops charged 14,000 Peruvian defenders in Chorrillos. During the Battle of Chorrillos, the Chileans inflicted a harsh defeat and eliminated Lima's first defensive line. Following a triumph in the Battle of Miraflores, the Chilean army entered Lima on January 17, 1881.:296 After the battle there were fires and sackings in the towns of Chorrillos and Barranco. As war booty, Chile ransacked the contents of the National Library of Peru in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian, and Colonial volumes) to Santiago de Chile, along with much capital stock. In November 2007, Chile returned 3,778 stolen books to the National Library. 3,000 wagons carried the plunder that hadn't already left by sea. The Peruvian dictator Nicolás de Piérola retreated from the capital to try governing from the rear, and defied Chile's demand for territory and indemnity.
Without a Peruvian president who was willing to accept their terms, on February 22, 1881, the Chileans allowed a convention of Peruvian "notables" outside of Lima to elect Francisco García Calderón as president. Garcia Calderón was allowed to raise and arm two infantry battalions (400 men each) and two small cavalry squadrons to add credibility to the provisional government.
Campaign of the Breña or Sierra
The occupation commander, Vice-admiral Patricio Lynch, sited his military headquarters in theGovernment Palace of Peru in Lima. After the confrontations in San Juan and Miraflores, Peruvian Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres escaped to the central Andes to organize resistance. This would come to be known as the Campaign of the Breña or Sierra, which organized a rebellion in Lima and eventually organized a widespread resistance.
Despite the Bolivian tax crisis of 1879, Chile voted in a new Congress on schedule. In 1881 Domingo Santa Maria was elected President, assuming office on September 18, 1881. A new Congress was elected on schedule in 1882. The new administration pushed for an end to the costly war. In February 1881, Chilean forces under Lt. Col. Ambrosio Letelier started the first Expedition, with 700 men, to defeat the last guerrilla bands from Huanuco (April 30) to Junin. After many losses the expedition achieved very little and returned to Lima in early July,:309- where Letelier and his officers were courts-martialed for diverting money into their own pockets.
To annihilate the guerrillas, in January 1882 Lynch started an offensive with 5,000 men:315- first towards Tarma and then southeast towards Huancayo, reaching Izcuchaca. Lynch's army suffered enormous hardships and more than 5,000 Chilean soldiers were faced with major hurdles like cold temperatures, snow, and mountain sickness. On July 9, 1882 they fought the emblematic Battle of La Concepción. The Chileans had to pull back with a loss of 534 soldiers: 154 in combat, 277 of disease and 103 deserters.
During the James A. Garfield administration (March 4—September 19, 1881), the anglophobicSecretary of State James G. Blaine wanted to advance the US presence in Latin America. He believed that England had prodded Chile into war to secure England's mining interests. Blaine proposed that Chile accept a monetary indemnity and renounce claims to Antofagasta and Tarapacá. These American attempts reinforced Garcia Calderon's refusal to discuss the matter of territorial cession. When it became known that Blaine's representative, Stephen Hurlburt, would personally profit from the settlement, it was clear that Hurlburt was complicating the peace process. Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen, Blaine's successor, publicly disavowed Blaine's policy, rejected any notion of intervening militarily in the dispute:306 and accepted Chile's right to annex Tarapacá.:329
Because Garcia Calderon refused to relinquish Peruvian control over Tarapacá, he was arrested. Before Garcia Calderon left Peru for Chile, he named Admiral Lizardo Montero as successor. At the same time President Pierola stepped back and supported Avelino Caceres for the Presidency. Caceres refused to serve and supported Lizardo Montero instead. Montero moved to Arequipa and in this way Garcia Calderon's arrest unified the forces of Pierola and Caceres.(p329)
On April 1, 1882 Miguel Iglesias, Defence Minister under Pierola, became convinced that the war had to be brought to an end or Peru would be completely devastated. He issued a manifesto, "Grito de Montan", calling for peace and in December 1882 convened a convention of representatives of the seven northern departments, where he was elected "Regenerating President":329-330 To support Iglesias against Montero, on April 6, 1883, Patricio Lynch started a new offensive to drive the Montoneros from central Peru and destroy Caceres' little army. The Chilean troops pursued Caceres northwest through narrow mountain passes until July 10, 1883, winning the definitive Battle of Huamachuco, the final Peruvian defeat.:317-338
After signing the peace treaty on October 20, 1883 with Iglesias' government, Lizardo Montero tried to resist in Arequipa with a force of 4,000 men, but when Chile's 3,000 fighters arrived, the troops in Arequipa revolted and allowed the Chileans to occupy the city. Montero opted for Bolivian asylum.On October 29, 1883 the Chilean occupation of Lima ended.
Peace treaty with Peru
On October 20, 1883 hostilities between Chile and Peru formally came to an end under the Treaty of Ancón. Chile was to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. For decades thereafter, the two countries failed to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally in 1929, through US mediation under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru reacquired Tacna and received some concessions in Arica.
Peace treaty with Bolivia
In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that relinquished the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its nitrate, copper and other mineral deposits. A 1904 treaty made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build the Arica-La Paz railway, a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.
International Law of War
Nevertheless, there were accusations of atrocities by all three parties.
For example, in the aftermath of the Battle of Huamachuco, Chilean Colonel Alejandro Gorostiaga ordered a repase, or execution of Peruvian soldiers (including those wounded) still left in the battlefield, under the pretext that they formed part of an irregular army and could therefore not be considered prisoners of war.
Strategy and technology
Control of the sea was Chile's key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau. While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and used its smaller navy as a raiding force. The raids delayed the ground invasion for six months, and forced Chile to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting and capturing the Huascar. After achieving naval supremacy, sea-mobile forces proved to be an advantage for desert warfare on the long coastline. Peruvian and Bolivian defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers from home while Chilean invading forces were usually just a few kilometers from the sea.
Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility. They landed ground forces in enemy territory to raid, landed in strength to split and drive out defenders and then garrisoned the territory as the fighting moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war maneuvering through long overland distances and relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields. Coastal railways reached to central Peru and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. When retreating, "Allied" forces made sure that few assets, if any, remained to be used by the enemy. According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America—Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" some Chinese coolies supported the Chileans against Peruvian plantation owners in Peru. Several Peruvian towns were shelled, sacked and destroyed.
The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 took a different form. The war theater was the Peruvian Sierra, where the rebels had easy access to population, resource and supply centers far from the sea; supporting an indefinitewar of attrition. The occupying Chilean force was split into small garrisons across the theater and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down dispersed rebels. After a costly occupation and prolonged counterinsurgency campaign, Chile sought a diplomatic exit. Rifts within Peruvian society and Peruvian defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.
Both sides employed late 19th-century military technology such as breech-loading rifles and cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-builtlanding craft. The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where no major power was involved, and attracted British, French, and U.S. observers. During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and was scuttled at the end to prevent her capture.
The USS Wachusett (1861) commanded by Alfred Thayer Mahan, was stationed at Callao, Peru, to protect American interests during the war's final stages. Mahan formulated his concept of sea power while reading history in an English gentlemen's club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
The war gained little attention outside South America because no major power participated, although the mineral wealth involved gave Britain and to an extent the US, a stake in the outcome. After the beginning of the war, the government of Great Britain declared its neutrality and refused to allow Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to take delivery of military or naval materiel on British soil.
In the 1870s Peru's president Manuel Pardo established a government monopoly to control the sale of nitrate and in 1875 Peru expropriated the salitreras. The Peruvian Government issued interest bearing certificates for the former owners and promised to redeem them in two years.
The "Credit Industrial" and the "Peruvian Company", representing European and American creditors of Peru, offered to lend the money that Peru required to pay reparations to Chile in order to avoid Chilean annexation of Tarapacá. In return Peru granted mining concessions in Tarapacá to foreigners.:210 and ff
The nitrate traders and creditors were aware that they would receive payment only once the war ended, so they used their political influence to push for a quick settlement. Chilean groups joined with them to obtain a convenient solution for their interests.
The War of the Pacific left traumatic scars on all three societies.
For Bolivians, the loss of the Litoral (the coast) remained a deeply emotional and practical issue, as was particularly evident during the 2003 natural gas riots. Popular belief attributed many of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; recovering the seacoast was seen as the solution to these difficulties. Numerous Bolivian Presidents pressured Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile were severed on March 17, 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. The leading Bolivian newspaper El Diario featured at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrated a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss.
Chile fared better economically, gaining a lucrative territory with significant mineral income. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired lands. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly. High nitrate profits lasted for several decades, but fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed duringWorld War I. This led to a massive economic breakdown (known as the Nitrate Crisis). Many industrial factories had closed in the early 1880s to provide labor for the extraction industry. Loss of industry dramatically slowed the country's industrial development. When the saltpeter mines closed or became unprofitable, the British companies left the country, destroying many jobs. The former Bolivian region remained the world's richest source of copper and its ports moved trade between nearby countries and the Pacific Ocean. The former Peruvian region suffered because no new sources of richness appeared after the Nitrate Crisis. On August 28, 1929, Chile returned Tacna to Peru, who later discovered huge copper deposits.
During the war Chile waived most of its claim over the Patagonia in the 1881 Chile/Argentina treaty, to ensure Argentina's neutrality. After the war, the Puna de Atacama dispute grew until 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. On August 28, 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru. In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to fully implement the Treaty of Lima, providing Peru with a port in Arica.
Ericka Beckman argued that during and after the war there was a rise of racial and national superiority ideas among the Chilean ruling class. Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes (son of president Manuel Bulnes) once wrote, "What defeated Peru was the superiority of a race and of a history".
During the occupation of Tacna and Arica (1884–1929) the Peruvian people and nation were treated in racist and denigrating terms by the Chilean press.
According to Bruce W. Farcau, "in Peru, the wounds run less deep than in neighboring Bolivia". On the other hand, George J. Mills argued that after Peru's defeat, "Peruvian resentment, born of the loss of her nitrate territories, is still smoldering." According to military historian Robert L. Scheina, the Chilean plunder of Peruvian national literary and art treasures contributed to "demands of revenge among Peruvians for decades."Brooke Larson pointed out that the War of the Pacific was the "first time since independence wars" that "Peru was invaded, occupied and pillaged by a foreign army" and that "no other Andean republic experienced such a costly and humiliating defeat as Peru did in the hands of Chile".
- Rosales, Justo Abel (1984). Mi campaña al Perú, 1879-1881 (My campaign to Peru, 1879-1881).1. Concepción, Chile: Editorial de la Universidad de Concepción. in Spanish
- Gutierrez, Hipólito (1956). Crónica de un soldado de la Guerra del Pacífico (Chronicle of a soldier in the Pacific War). 1. Santiago de Chile, Chile: Editorial del Pacífico. in Spanish
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881a). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880) (History of the War of the Pacific (1879-1880)). 1. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca. in Spanish
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881b). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880) (History of the War of the Pacific (1879-1880)). 2. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca. in Spanish
- Chilean government (1879-1881). Boletin de la Guerra del Pacifico (Bulletin of the War of the Pacific). Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andres Bello. in Spanish
- De Varigny, Charles (1922). La Guerra del Pacifico (The War of the Pacific). 1. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes. in Spanish (published first time 1881-1882 in Revue des deux mondes)
- Jefferson Dennis, William (1927). Documentary history of the Tacna-Arica dispute from University of Iowa studies in the social sciences. 8. Iowa: University Iowa City.
- Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe (1884). Narracion Historica de la Guerra de Chile contra Peru y Bolivia (Historical narration of the Chile's War against Peru and Bolivia). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta y Libreria de Mayo, calle Peru 115. in Spanish
- Basadre, Jorge (1964). "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile (History of Peru, The War on Chile)". Lima, Peru: Peruamerica S.A.,. in Spanish
- Bulnes, Gonzalo (1920). Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879. Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Universitaria.
- Farcau, Bruce W. (2000). The Ten Cents War, Chile, Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-96925-8. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Sater, William F. (2007). Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-4334-7.
- Sater, William F. (1986). Chile and the War of the Pacific. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-4155-0.
- English, Adrian J. (1985). Armed forces of Latin America: their histories, development, present strength, and military potential. Jane's Information Group, Incorporated. ISBN 0710603215.
- Milla Batres, Carlos (1994). Enciclopedia biográfica e histórica del Perú: siglos XIX-XX. Michigan: Editorial Milla Batres. p. 71. ISBN 9789589413005. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- Scheina, Robert L. (2003). Latin America's Wars: The age of the caudillo, 1791-1899. Potomac Books, Inc.. ISBN 9781574884500.
- Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú (2004). Historia marítima del Perú, Volume 2; Volume 11. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú.ISBN 9789972633058. Retrieved January 17, 2009.
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- Anti-Chilean sentiment
- Atacama border dispute
- Battle of Tarapaca: Brief synopsis (in Spanish, from Website of Peruvian military central command)
- Chincha Islands War
- Chilean-Peruvian Maritime Dispute of 2006--2007
- Chile-Peru relations
- Puna de Atacama Lawsuit
- Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia
- War of the Confederation
- ^ 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre Basadre 1964
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Sater 2007
- ^ a b c sater, pp. 348–349 tables 22 and 23. The figures consider neither Chilean POWs (from "Rimac" and "Esmeralda" survivors) nor deserters
- ^ Approving Treaty on offensive and defensive alliance concluded between the Republics of Peru and Chile. Lima: Congress of Peru. 1865 (Spanish)
- ^ a b Boundary treaty between Bolivia and Chile. 1866 (Spanish)
- ^ See Private note of Riva-Agüero to Novoa, November 20, 1872. Godoy papers. Cited inBulnes 1920, pp. 58,59
- It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the relations between the two Republics should be defined, because it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the most favourable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line, it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in possession of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the definite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may have due weight.
- ^ a b British influence on the salt: the origin, nature and decline. Soto Cárdenas, Alejandro. Santiago : Ed. University of Santiago de Chile, 1998. Page 50
- ^ (See full English version of the treaty inBulnes 1920
- ^ Bulnes 1920, pp. 57–58
- The Treaty menaces Chile … Never was Chile in greater peril, nor has a more favourable moment been elected for reducing her to the mere leavings that interested none of the conspirators. The advantage to each of them was clear enough. Bolivia would expand three degrees on the coast; Argentina would take possession of all our eastern territories to whatever point she liked; Peru would make Bolivia pay her with the salitre region. The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportunity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce conflict: Bolivia: the profit of the business: Patagonia and the salitre.
- ^ Basadre 1964, p. 2282 "The beginning of the Peruvian naval inferiority and lack of initiative for preventive war":
- Won by Chile's supremacy at sea that year of 1874 contributed to the endeavor to avoid any problem Peru
- ^ Basadre 1964, p. 2286, "Peru in 1874 and 1878 avoid the alliance with Argentina":
- In August, September and October 1875 ... Peru will hasten to take footdragging and even inhibitory for signing the treaty with that republic [Argentina] in order to retain their freedom of action. The existence of the Chilean ironclads perhaps explains the difference between this attitude and previous
- In 1878 [the Peruvian government] refused to deliver the items ship orders by the Argentine government and collaborate in the search for a peaceful solution…
- ^ Retrospective of landlocked sea. A critical view on how the conflict started. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia
- ^ Chile-Bolivia-Peru: The War of the Pacific. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
- ^ a b Employers, policy, and the Pacific War. Luis Ortega. Santiago de Chile. 1984. (Page 18. File Antony Gibbs & Sons AGA. Valparaiso to Londres. Private N 25. March 6, 1878)
- ^ (Spanish) Boundary Treaty of 1866 between Chile and Bolivia
- ^ a b Barros Arana 1881a, p. 59
- ^ The Peruvian Historian stated See also Jorge Basadre, here (retrieved on 9 July 2009):
- El desembarco se efectuó sin resistencia, con manifestaciones de entusiasmo. La bandera chilena flameó en todos los edificios del puerto.
- ^ Bulnes 1920, pp. 42
- ^ War of the Pacific Chilean historianGonzalo Bulnes. Antofagasta and Tarapacá. 1911.
Tengo una buena noticia que darle. He fregado a los gringos (se refiere a Mr. Hicks) decretando la reivindicacion de las salitreras i no podran quitarnoslas por mas que se esfuerce el mundo entero. Espero que Chile no intervendra en este asunto... pero si nos declara la guerra podemos contar con el apoyo del Peru a quien exijiremos el cumplimiento del Tratado secreto. Con este objeto voi a mandar a Lima a Reyes 0rtiz. Ya ve Ud. como le doi buenas noticias que Ud. me ha de agradecer eternamente i como le dejo dicho los gringos estan completamente fregados i los chilenos tienen que morder i reclamar nada mas.
- ^ See Guillermo Lazos Carmona, History of the borders of Chile, page 65
- ^ History of war in America between Chili, Peru and Bolivia. Tommasso Caivano. 1882
- ^ Valentín Abecia Baldivieso. International relations in the history of Bolivia, Volume 2. La Paz: National Academy of Sciences of Bolivia (Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Bolivia). 1986. Page 73.
- But in reality no such declaration of war took place. The decree (Hilarión Daza's decree) to which this characteristic [of declaring war] is attributed only alludes that "Chile has indeed invaded the national territory", stipulating that "all commerce and communication with the Republic of Chile is cut for the duration of the war that [Chile] has promoted upon Bolivia." He later states that Chileans should vacate the country given deadlines in cases of emergency and taking action on property belonging to them. Therefore, it is not correct to attribute that Decree the characteristics of a declaration of war, because under the international law of the time, it was not. The steps taken were for security because Chile had taken Antofagasta. On April 3 the declaration of war by the Chilean Congress was approved, and by the 5th it became known throughout the press.
- Pero en realidad no hubo tal declaratoria de guerra. El decreto al que se le atribuye esa caracteristica solamente alude a que "Chile ha invadido de hecho el territorio nacional", disponiendo que "queda cortado todo comercio y comunicación con la República de Chile mientras dure la guerra que ha promovido a Bolivia". Luego habla de que los chilenos deben desocupar el territorio nacional dando plazos en casos de excepcion y tomando medidas sobre las propiedades que les perteneciera. Por consiguiente, no es correcto atribuir a ese Decreto las características de una declaratoria de guerra, no lo fue. Las medidas adoptadas fueron de propia seguridad ante un hecho consumado por Chile con la toma de Antofagasta. El 3 de abril se aprobó la declaración de la guerra por el Congreso chileno y el 5 se conocía a través de la prensa.
- ^ Ramiro Prudencio Lizon, The Taking of Antofagasta
- ^ Atilio Sivirichi. History of Peru
- ^ (See full English version in Bulnes 1920
- "Republics of Bolivia and Peru, desirous of drawing together in a solemn manner the bonds which unite them, thus augmenting their strength and mutually guaranteeing certain rights, formulate the present treaty of Defensive Alliance; for which object the President of Bolivia has conferred power adequate for such a negotiation to Juan de la Cruz Benavente, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotenciary in Peru, and the President of Peru has conferred like powers to Jose de la Riva-Aguero; who have agreed on the following stipulations:
- Article I. The High Contracting Parties unite and league together mutually to guarantee their independence, their sovereignty and the integrity of their territories respectively, obliging themselves by the terms of the present treaty to defend themselves against all foreign aggression, whether emanating from one or several independent states or from a force without flag and obeying no recognised power.
- Additional Article:
- The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary."
- ^ a b c d War of the Pacific. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
- ^ Current History (1922) (page 450) The New York Times
- ^ Bulnes 1920, pp. 147
- ^ Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148. Bulnes Gonzalo.
- ^ Basadre 1964, p. 40 Volume VI
- ^ Peruvian Congress March 24, 1879
- ^ Campana de Tarapacá. Vicuna Mackena. Santiago de Chile
- ^ 2007, p. 113–114
- "There are numerous differences of opinion as to the ships' speed and armament. Some of these differences can be attributed to the fact that the various sources may have been evaluating the ships at different times."
- ^ a b c d Cap. Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, Miguel Grau, page 70-71.
- ^ English 1985, p. 372
- ^ a b c Scheina 2003, p. 377
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 57
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 48
- ^ English 1985, p. 75
- ^ Stanislav Andreski Wars, revolutions, dictatorships: studies of historical and contemporary problems from a comparative viewpoint page 105:
- (...) Chile's army and fleet were better equipped, organised and commanded(...)
- ^ Helen Miller Bailey, Abraham Phineas Nasatir Latin America: the development of its civilization page 492:
- Chile was a much more modernized nation with better-trained and better-equipped
- ^ Scheina 2003, pp. 376–377
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 65
- As the earlier discussion of the geography of the Atacama region illustrates, control of the sea lanes along the coast would be absolutely vital to the success of a land campaign there
- ^ Vargas Valenzuela, José (1974). Tradición naval del pueblo de Bolivia. Bolivia: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro. p. 61. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- ^ 2007, p. 102 and ff
- "… to anyone willing to sail under Bolivia's colors …"
- ^ a b Boletín de la guerra del Pacifico. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello. 1879. p. 288. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- ^ a b c Sater 2007, p. 113–114
- ^ a b c Paz Soldan 1884, p. 114
- ^ a b Farcau 2000, pp. 55–56
- ^ López Urrutia, Carlos (2003). La Guerra del Pacífico, 1879-1884. Ristre Editorial. pp. 37–42. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- ^ Spila, Benedetto (1883). Chile en la guerra del Pacífico. Valparaíso, Chile: Impr. del Neuvo Mercurio. p. 94. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- ^ a b Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto (1972). Guerra del Pacífico, 1879. California: Instituto Geográfico Militar. p. 44. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ Tamayo Herrera, José (1985). Nuevo compendio de historia del Perú. Virginia: CEPAR. p. 285. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ Mila Batres 1994, p. 71
- ^ Arosemena Garland, Geraldo (1962). El Almirante Miguel Grau. Lima, Peru: Ministerio de Educación Pública. pp. 188. Retrieved January 17, 2009.
- ^ Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú 2004, p. 188
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 214
- ^ a b Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú 2004
- ^ Mellafe Maturana, Rafael; Mauricio Pelayo González (2007). La guerra del Pacífico: en imágenes, relatos, testimonios. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. p. 130. ISBN 9789568147334. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- ^ López Urrutia, Carlos; Jorge Ortíz Sotelo (2005). Monitor Huáscar: una historia compartida (1865-2005). Lima, Peru: Asociación de Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana. p. 49. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- ^ Historia del Ejército de Chile, Volume 6. Santiago, Chile: Estado Mayor General del Ejército. 1980. p. 54. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- ^ Luna Vegas, Emilio (1978). Cáceres, genio militar. Peru: Librería Editorial Minerva-Miraflores. p. 19. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ Valdés Vergara, Francisco (1908). Historia de Shile para la enseñanza primaria. California: Sociedad "Imprenta y litografía Universo". p. 319. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ Milla Batres 1994, p. 73
- ^ Elías Murguía, Julio J. (1980). Marinos peruanos en Arica. Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Maritimos del Perú. p. 38. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ Basadre 1964, p. 2538
- ^ Calero y Moreira, Jacinto (1794). Mercurio peruano. Peru: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. pp. 44–46. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- ^ a b Sater 2007, p. 172-
- ^ 2007, p. 204
- "only the lack of allied cavalry prevented Buendia's [Peruvian] men from finishing off the few remaining survivors"
- ^ 2007, p. 205
- "The victorious troops had no choice, as Colonel Suarez ruefully admitted, but to abandon Tarapacá to the Chileans".
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 119
- ^ 2007, p. 181
- "not only a economic bonanza but also a diplomatic asset that could barter in return for Peru ending the war".
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 120
- "He [Prado] was met with widespread rioting in the capital in protest over the administration's abysmal handling of the war to date"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 120
- "…Prado suddenly gathered up his belongings … and took a ship …"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 121
- "Pierola … mounted an assault on the Palace but … leaving more than three hundred corpses …"
- ^ 2007, p. 208
- "Daza received a telegram from Camacho, informing him that the army no longer …"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 130
- "In the early morning hours of the 31. December 1879 …"
- ^ Sater 2007, p. 222
- "Baquedano could not simply bypass the Peruvian troops, whose presence threatened Moquegua as well as the communications network extending southeast across the Locumba Valley to Tacna and northwest to Arequipa and northeast to Bolivia"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 138 specifies 3,100 men in Arequipa, 2,000 men in Arica and 9,000 men in Tacna, but this figures contradict the total numbers given (below) by William F. Sater in page 229
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 138
- "…it became evident that there was a total lack of the necessary transport for even the minimum amount of supplies and water"
- ^ 2007, p. 227
- "The allied force, he [Campero] concluded lacked sufficient transport to move into the field its artillery as well as its rations and, more significantly, its supplies of water"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 1147
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 152
- "Lynch's force consisted f the 1° Line Regiment and the Regiments "Talca" and "Colchagua", a battery of mountain howitzers, and a small cavalry squadron for a total of twenty-two hundred man"
- ^ Barros Arana 1881b, p. 98
- "[The Chilean government thought that it was possible to demonstrate to the enemy the futility of any defense of Peruvian territory not only against the whole [Chilean] army but also against small [Chilean] divisions. That was the purpose of the expedition, which the claims, insults, and affliction in the official documents of Peru and in the press had made famous"
- (Original: "[El gobierno chileno] Creía entonces que todavía era posible demostrar prácticamente al enemigo la imposibilidad en que se hallaba para defender el territorio peruano no ya contra un ejército numeroso sino contra pequeñas divisiones. Este fué el objeto de una espedicion que las quejas, los insultos i las lamentaciones de los documentos oficiales del Perú, i de los escritos de su prensa, han hecho famosa.")
- ^ Basadre 1964, p. 2475
- ^ Barros Arana 1881a quotes Johann Caspar Bluntschli:
- "Bluntschili (Derecho internacional codificado) dice espresamente lo que sigue: Árt. 544. Cuando el enemigo ha tomado posesión efectiva de una parte del territorio, el gobierno del otro estado deja de ejercer alli el poder. Los habitantes del territorio ocupado están eximidos de todos los deberes i obligaciones respecto del gobierno anterior, i están obligados a obedecer a los jefes del ejército de ocupación."
- ^ Valdes Arroyo, Flor de Maria (2004). Las relaciones entre el Perú e Italia (1821-2002). Lima, Peru: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru.ISBN 9974-42-626-2., page 97, in Spanish language
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 153
- ^ John Lawrence Rector The history of Chilepage 102
- ^ Jason Zorbas The influence of domestic politics on America's Chilean policy during the War of the Pacific page 22:
- "The Chilean public demanded that Lima be taken. Bloodlust ran high, as some of the press demanded that the Moneda (the Chilean equivalent of the White House) ""exterminate the enemy the same as Great Britain and Argentina had annihilated the Zulus and the Indians."" The government struggled to satisfy the public demands for an invasion. During the last months of 1880, the Chilean armed forces prepared for a full invastion [sic?] of Peru and as the new year arrived the Chilean forces were poised outside Lima and prepared to invade the capital"
- ^ Farcau 2000, pp. 149–150
- "Despite this expectations …"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 157
- "… until all vestiges of organized military force in Peru had been destroyed and the capital occupied"
- ^ a b Farcau 2000, p. 164
- "This gave Baquedano some twenty thousand men in the assault with a further three thousand in reserve against about fourteen thousand Peruvians in the line with twenty-five hundred in reserve"
- ^ Dan Collyns. "Chile returns looted Peru books". BBC. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
- ^ Hugh Chisholm. "Encyclopedia Brittanica: Lima". Google Books. Retrieved 2008-12-04.
- ^ 2007, p. 302
- "which he [Nicolás de Piérola] did not"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 173
- ^ John Edwin Fagg Latin America: a general history" page 860
- ^ Steve J. Stern Resistance, rebellion, and consciousness in the Andean peasant worldpage 241
- ^ Sater 1986, p. 180
- "Even in the midst of the Bolivian crisis, congressional elections occurred in schedule. In 1881, the nation selected a new president, Domingo Santa Maria, and the following year, elected a new congress"
- ^ 2007, p. 312
- "Consequently, the court stripped Letelier of his rank, sentenced him to six years in jail, and demanded restitution"
- ^ 2007, p. 304–306
- "The anglophobic secretary of state …"
- ^ Farcau 2000, pp. 181–182
- ^ Farcau 2000, pp. 183–187
- ^ Sater 1986, p. 220
- "Since Montero was not a party to the Treaty of Ancon …"
- ^ 2007, p. 90
- "Happily for the wounded the three warring nations adhered to the Geneva Convention."
- ^ Los héroes olvidados. Batalla de Huamachuco.
- ^ Cáceres, Andrés. "Memorias de la guerra del 79" pág. 231
- ^ The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan by Richard W. Turk; Greenwood Press, 1987. 183 pgs. page 10
- ^ Larrie D. Ferreiro 'Mahan and the "English Club" of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of The Influence of Sea Power upon History', The Journal of Military History - Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 901-906
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 2
- "it has largely been ignored outside the region as neither the USA nor any major European power had a stake in the game"
- ^ 2007, p. 85
- "Great Britain, for example, refused to allow Chile to take delivery of military or naval supplies on English soil."
- ^ Sater 1986, p. 127
- " In 1875, hagridden by financial problems, …"
- ^ Sater 1986, p. 305
- "An the sudden appearance of two previously unknown corporations - the Credit Industrial and the Peruvian Company - …"
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 149
- "Another factor working in favor of a quick settlement to the conflict was the influence of the neutral powers …"
- ^ "El día del mar se recordará con más que un tradicional desfile cívico" (in Spanish). Bolpress. 15. p. 1. Retrieved 2 October 2009.
- ^ Crow, The Epic of Latin America, p. 180
- ^ Foster, John B. & Clark, Brett. (2003)."Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism" (accessed September 2, 2005). The Socialist Register 2004, p190-192. Also available in print from Merlin Press.
- ^ Dominguez, Jorge et al. 2003 Boundary Disputes in Latin America. United States Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace.
- ^ Ericka Beckman Imperial Impersonations: Chilean Racism and the War of the PacificUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- ^ Farcau 2000, p. 169
- ^ William E. Skuban Lines in the sand: nationalism and identity on the Peruvian-Chilean frontier page 79:
- "because it is undoubtedly preferable to be Chilean than Peruvian, because has a cleaner and more glorious history, and its better to belong to the phalanx of the conquerors than that of the conquered, because the Chilean race is more virile, valiant, prouder, nobler and more enterprising than the Peruvian race, which due to reasons of climate will always be enervated" Chilean newspaper El Corvoquote in page 80
- ^ Chile: physical features, natural resources, means of communication by George J. Mills, William Henry Koebel (page 39)
- ^ Scheina 2003, p. 388
- ^ Larson, Brooke. 2004. Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910. Page 178.